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This paper infers the terms of trade effects of Free Trade Agreements (FTA's) with the structural gravity
model. Using panel data methods to resolve two way causality between trade and FTA's, we estimate
direct FTA effects on bilateral trade volume in 2 digit manufacturing goods from 1990-2002. We deduce
the terms of trade changes implied by these volume effects for 40 countries plus a rest-of-the-world
aggregate. Some gain over 10%, some lose less than 0.2%. Overall,  using a novel measure of the change
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The proliferation of regional trade agreements in the 1990's alarmed many trade policy
analysts and popular observers because trade diverted from non-partners reduces their
terms of trade. The harm to outsiders could even outweigh the terms of trade gains to
partners, reducing the eciency of the world trading system. This paper calculates the
terms of trade eects, and a novel measure of the global eciency eects, of 1990's trade
agreements in 2 digit manufacturing sectors. The results are reassuring: regionalism
delivered benets while negligibly harming outsiders. Some countries gain over 10%, a
few lose less than 0:2% and global eciency rises 0:62%.
Theory gives great prominence to the terms of trade eects of trade agreements while
simulation models illustrate the theory with numerical measures of terms of trade changes
due to tari changes. In contrast, there is little empirical evidence on the eect of
trade agreements on the terms of trade, because terms of trade are notoriously hard to
measure and there are dicult inference problems with ascribing causation.1 Our solution
is to estimate volume eects using the empirical gravity model, and then deduce their
terms of trade implications using the restrictions of structural gravity. The remarkable
conrmation of structural gravity in Anderson and Yotov (2010b) justies this intensive
use of the structure.
Our research extends a large empirical literature on the trade volume eects of Free
Trade Agreements (FTA's) based on the gravity equation. Notable studies of the volume
eects of FTAs include Frankel (1997), Magee (2003) and Baier and Bergstrand (2002,
1Feenstra (2004, pp. 197-99) reviews the literature. Studies using prices directly are quite limited
in scope due to the diculties in assembling comparable price data across a wide range of countries
as well as inferring the eect of FTAs on prices. Chang and Winters (2002) address both problems
using export unit values at the 6 digit Harmonized System level for Brazil. See their footnote 5, pp.
891-2, for discussion of the severe limitations. They treat prices as set by a foreign and domestic
rm in a duopoly pricing game that avoids general equilibrium considerations. Clausing (2001) uses a
partial equilibrium model disaggregated by sector that links import volume changes to tari changes for
Canada, and does not go on to link them to price changes. Romalis (2007) simulates the equilibrium
price changes induced by the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) tari changes using detailed demand elasticities estimated with a \dierence
in dierences based estimation technique to identify demand elasticities that focuses on where each of the
NAFTA partners sources its imports of almost 5,000 6-digit Harmonized System (HS-6) commodities and
comparing this to the source of European Union (EU) imports of the same commodities. The technique
enables identication of NAFTA's eects on trade volumes even when countries production costs shift."2004, 2007). Early ndings on the eects of FTAs and trading blocs on bilateral trade
ows were mixed,2 but recent developments in the empirical literature that deal eectively
with two way causality show that trading blocs and free trade agreements have large
direct eects on aggregate bilateral trade between member countries relative to non-
member countries. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) nd that, on average, a FTA induces
approximately a 100% increase in bilateral trade between member relative to non-member
countries within ten years from their inception. Volume changes like these, larger than
explicable by tari changes, are plausible because FTA's typically induce unobservable
trade cost reductions alongside the formal tari reductions that are the direct object of
the agreement. Non-tari barriers are typically also reduced between FTA partners3 while
the enhanced security of bilateral trade induces relationship-specic investment in trade
with partner counter-parties. Compared to Romalis (2007) focused on tari changes in
NAFTA, our approach focuses on these induced changes.
The terms of trade, the ratio of the index of sellers' prices to the index of buyers'
prices, is measured consistently with the underlying theory for each country in our data.
The bilateral volume eects of FTA's lower bilateral trade costs between partners directly
while general equilibrium eects of FTA's indirectly change multilateral resistance (the
sellers' and buyers' incidence of trade costs) of every country in the world. General
equilibrium also links changes in sellers' incidence to changes in sellers' prices while
buyers' prices move with buyers' incidence measured by inward multilateral resistance.
These price changes are consistently aggregated into terms of trade changes.
We estimate the volume and terms of trade eects of free trade agreements imple-
mented between 1990 and 2002. In contrast to much of the empirical gravity literature,
we estimate trade gravity equations disaggregated at the 2 digit ISIC level in manufac-
turing. We nd large volume eects comparable to the aggregate estimates of Baier and
2For example, Bergstrand (1985) found insignicant European Community (EC) eects on bilateral
member's trade and Frankel et al (1995) supported his ndings. Frankel (1997) found signicant Mercosur
eects on trade ows but even negative EC eects on trade in certain years. Frankel (1997) also provides
a summary of coecient estimates of the FTA eects from dierent studies. Ghosh and Yamarik (2004)
perform extreme-bounds analysis to support the claim that the FTA eects on trade ows are fragile
and unstable.
3Canadian support for the CUSFTA was based primarily on its provision for bi-national review of US
antidumping procedures, a benet not measurable by reduction of already low taris.
2Bergstrand (2007) but varying across sectors. We use structural gravity to calculate the
eect of FTAs on buyers' and sellers' incidence and the associated sellers' price changes
in 40 separate countries and an aggregate region consisting of 24 additional nations (none
of which entered FTAs).
The results show that the 1990's FTA's signicantly increased real manufacturing
income of most economies in the world. 10 out of the 40 countries had terms of trade
gains greater than 5% while gains of 10% or more were enjoyed by Bulgaria, Hungary
and Poland. Losses were smaller than  0:2% and conned to countries that did not enter
into FTA's: Australia, China, Korea and Japan (and the rest of the world aggregate).4
FTA's change trade ows and thus, using the iceberg melting metaphor of gravity,
how much of the iceberg melts. The metaphor is quantied with an intuitive and novel
measure of the global eciency of distribution averaged over all bilateral shipments in all
sectors. We apply the distance function (Deaton, 1979), itself an application of Debreu's
coecient of resource utilization (1951). The global eciency of trade rises in each
manufacturing sector (ranging from 0.11% for Minerals to 2.1% for Textiles) with an
overall eciency gain of 0:62%.
A NAFTA counter-factual experiment reveals large benet to Mexico. Most of Mex-
ico's gains disappear if NAFTA is switched o, while without NAFTA the US and Canada
would have lost a little from the FTA inceptions in the rest of the global economy.
The terms of trade changes measured here are impact eects. Terms of trade will shift
further in a full general equilibrium analysis. We assume an endowments economy. Non-
manufactured goods are suppressed. These assumptions avoid building a complete general
equilibrium model, which would require taking a stand on specication and parameter
estimation of many dubious structural components. Standard implications of maximizing
behavior with substitution imply that our estimates are lower bounds of the real income
gains from FTA's via terms of trade eects. We also assume no rents as part of the trade
4The positive sum feature of these results, in contrast to the usual zero-sum implication of simple
trade policy theory, arises for two reasons. First, directly, less of the iceberg melts in bilateral shipments
between FTA partners due to a reduction in border frictions. Second, the change in all bilateral trade
ows at given border frictions can raise or lower the total amount melted. The results show that the
combination is positive, though in principle it need not be.
3costs, hence we ignore the income eects of net revenue or rent changes due to the change
in trade policy. The no rent assumption avoids having to model many unobservable rents
while the observable tari revenue changes are a very small part of the income changes,
as discussed further in Section 1.
Section 1 presents the theoretical foundation. Section 2 discusses the estimation of
the gravity equation and the trade volume eect of FTA's. Section 3 presents the terms
of trade and global eciency eects of switching on the FTA's of the 1990's in the base
year 1990. Section 4 concludes with some suggestions for further research.
1 Theoretical Foundation
Gravity's empirical plausibility is based on goodness of t: some 90% of the variation of
bilateral trade ows is explained. Structural gravity obtained credibility from clearing
up the border puzzle (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003), while Anderson and Yotov
(2010b) show that structural gravity comes remarkably close to accurately representing
the data. We take this as justication to lean heavily on structural gravity theory to infer
terms of trade changes from the volume changes we estimate using Baier and Bergstrand's
technique.
To avoid taking a stand on many features of the economy that are dicult to model
convincingly, we assume each country has an endowment vector of the manufacturing
goods for which we have data. We thus suppress substitutability in supply and we ignore
interaction with the rest of the economy. We assume that all manufactured goods are
intermediate, a convenient and common convention in the literature.
For further simplicity, we assume that no rents are associated with trade ows. All
trade costs and their changes are treated as `real' in our setup. Thus we suppress tari
revenues (which indeed are small for most goods and countries), quota rents (which
are large for some country pairs and product lines but notoriously hard to measure) and
monopoly rents associated with various trade barriers both formal and especially informal.
This procedure departs substantially from the theoretical literature on the welfare eects
4of trade agreements, where the changes in rents play a key role. We do not believe that
rents and their changes are unimportant, but we do think that tari revenues and their
changes are a small part of the rents and the non-tari rents are extremely dicult to
measure.5 Eorts in this direction would distract from our focus on the terms of trade
without much assurance of being more realistic.
Goods are dierentiated by place of origin within each goods class. Each goods class
forms a weakly separable group in demand with a Constant Elasticity of Substitution
(CES) aggregator cost function that is identical across countries. We interpret the goods
as intermediate inputs. Technological requirements at the upper, inter-sectoral, level are
for convenience represented by a Cobb-Douglas aggregator function, which translates into
constant expenditure shares k,
P
k k = 1, across sectors within manufacturing.
The technology assumptions together with iceberg trade costs (distribution uses re-
sources in the same proportion as production) imply trade separability: sellers' prices
and consumer expenditures are aected only by the aggregate incidence of trade costs
in each sector, independent of the details of the distribution of sales or purchases across









ij  1 denotes the trade cost factor on shipment
of goods in class k from i to j, and pk
i is the factory-gate price at i. Eectively it is
as if goods melt away in distribution so that 1 unit shipped becomes 1=tk
ij < 1 units on
arrival.
Technology requirements for manufacturing inputs are represented by a globally com-
mon CES cost function for each goods class k. Cost minimizing users have expenditure
5Anderson and van Wincoop (2002) perform a gravity model based simulation of NAFTA's eects
where tari revenue changes combine with terms of trade changes . Terms of trade changes are far more
important than revenue changes in the net welfare eects. That study points out that gravity does a far
better job of predicting the actual bilateral trade ow changes than did any of the CGE models surveyed.















Here k is the elasticity of substitution for goods' class k,6 and k
i is a CES share pa-






ij)1 k]1=(1 k) is a CES price index (subsequently will be
interpreted as buyers' incidence of trade costs).
Now consider the supply side and market clearance. The iceberg trade cost metaphor
implies that we can treat the value of shipments at end user prices, Y k
i for country i and
goods class k, as the product of the price at the factory gate pk
i times the endowment
qk
i , some of which is used up in getting to the end users. Y k
i = pk
i qk
i because end users
must pay the full production plus distribution cost.


















j ; 8k: (2)
Dene Y k 
P
i Y k



















The derivation of the structural gravity model is completed using (3) to substitute for
6Recent developments in the empirical trade literature suggest that the elasticity of substitution varies
across countries. See Broda et al (2006). In the empirical analysis however, we do not allow the elasticity
to vary across countries.
6k
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(4)-(6) is the structural gravity model. k
i denotes outward multilateral resistance (OMR),
while P k
j denotes inward multilateral resistance (IMR).
Outward multilateral resistance is the average sellers' incidence. It is as if each country
i shipped its product k to a single world market facing supply side incidence of trade costs
of k
i. (3) is interpreted as the market clearance condition for a hypothetical world market
where a single representative buyer purchases variety i in class k at price pk
i k
i.7
Inward multilateral resistance in (6) is a CES index of bilateral buyers' incidences
tk
ij=k
i. It is as if each country j bought its vector of class k goods from a single world
market facing demand side incidence of P k
j .
The equilibrium factory gate prices pk
i reect the forces of supply and demand in
the global economy and also the sellers' incidence of trade costs facing the entire global









Due to (3), pk
i is decreasing in k
i, a connection tying terms of trade eects of FTA's
to the incidence analysis of the gravity model. In conditional general equilibrium with
given Y k
i 's, the relationship is the simple inverse one given above: a fall in incidence raises
factory gate prices one for one. But in general equilibrium Y k
i =Y k is also a function of
the p's and the solution for the p's reects supply and demand conditions and sellers'
incidence in all markets simultaneously.
7The CES cost index for this hypothetical user in the world market is conventionally equal to 1 due
to summing (3) over i.
71.2 Incidence and Total Eects of Free Trade Agreements
The procedure in the existing literature for estimating FTA eects on bilateral trade ows
is to account for the presence of free trade agreements in the denition of the unobservable
trade costs, tk







Here, FTAij is an indicator variable for a free trade agreement between trading part-
ners i and j. lnDISTij is the logarithm of bilateral distance. BRDRij, LANGij and
CLNYij capture the presence of contiguous borders, common language and colonial ties,
respectively. Finally, we follow Anderson and Yotov (2010b) to dene SMCTRYij as a
set of country-specic dummy variables equal to 1 when i = j and zero elsewhere, which
capture the eect of crossing the international border by shifting up internal trade, all
else equal.8
It is clear from system (4)-(6) that the direct eect of free trade agreements on bilat-
eral trade ows, measured by 1 in (7), is only a fraction of the total FTA impact, which
includes two additional indirect eects. The rst additional FTA eect is channeled
through the multilateral resistance terms. For given output and expenditures, system
(13)-(14) maps changes in bilateral trade costs to changes in the multilateral resistances.
Consequently, (4) reveals that any MR changes will aect bilateral trade ows. The
second indirect FTA eect on trade ows is channeled through output and expenditures,
which enter (4) directly, but also are structural elements in the construction of the mul-
tilateral resistance indexes. This indirect eect requires accounting for the FTA-driven
changes in output and expenditures at the upper level equilibrium. In sum, in order to
8It should be noted that while controlling for internal trade has been ignored in the vast majority of
gravity estimates, the few studies that do include a variant of our SMCTRY covariate always estimate
large, positive and signicant coecient estimates on this dummy. For example, Wolf (2000) nds
evidence of US state border eects using aggregate shipments data. In the case of Canadian commodity
trade, Anderson and Yotov (2010a) nd that internal provincial trade is higher than interprovincial and
international trade for 19 non-service sectors during the period 1992-2003. In a complementary study,
Anderson et al (2011) obtain similar estimates for Canadian service trade. Jensen and Yotov (2011)
estimate very large and signicant SMCTRY impact for important agricultural commodities in the
world in 2001. Finally, Anderson and Yotov (2010b) estimate signicant, country-specic SMCTRY
eects for 18 manufacturing sectors in the world (76 countries), 1990-2002.
8estimate total FTA eects, one has to estimate FTA impact through the multilateral
resistances and through changes in output and expenditures, in addition to the direct
FTA eects on bilateral trade costs. We describe such a comprehensive procedure next.
As input to the evaluation, we estimate the tk
ij's with and without the FTA imposed
with panel methods. We take the initial year, pre-FTA, and choose units such that
pk
i = 1;8i;k. This implies that the endowments are observed from the initial Y k
i 's. We
then solve the market clearance equations (10) given below for the implied distribution
parameters k
i ;8i;k. Due to homogeneity, the distribution parameters are only identied
up to a normalization, chosen here as
P
i(k
i )1 k = 1.
To calculate the full eect of FTA's we conduct the counter-factual experiment of
putting the FTA eect (using the tk
ij's from later years) into the base year with xed
endowments. We nd the set of factory gate prices and inward and outward multilateral
resistances that results. Once we know the p's we can generate the Y 's, the expenditures
(E's) and the incidence variables, the P's and 's. The level of the incidence variables
is subject to the normalization of the k
I's, but their proportional change is invariant to
to the normalization.



































Y k. Here j > 0 is the ratio of total expenditure to manufacturing income in country j,
allowing for nationally varying manufacturing trade imbalance and/or total trade imbal-
ance and a nationally varying ratio of manufacturing income to total income. If all goods
were included in K and total trade was balanced, j = 1;8j.9 To avoid a full general
9Variation in 's is not an important concern, because in our application the results are almost
9equilibrium treatment of the link between manufacturing and the rest of the economy, j
is assumed to be constant in the comparative static experiments below.
There are NK p's that change from their initial value equal to 1 when the t's change
due to the FTA experiment. They are solved from the market clearance equations, given











































and (9) is utilized to replace Ek
j =Y k on the right of the right hand side of (10).
There are NK equations in (10) and another NK in (11). As with any neoclassical
market clearing conditions, a normalization of prices is required because the system is
homogeneous of degree zero in the vector of factory gate prices. A natural normalization










In (10)-(11), due to separability and homotheticity, only 2NK-K equations are lin-







i ;8k. To see this, let p1k  fpk
i g, denote the vector of equilibrium factory
gate prices in sector k in some particular equilibrium with the new t's. At this equi-
librium p1k, a scalar shift k in pk raises the P k
j 's equiproportionately. Then for the















i under the normalization (12), the equa-
tion block continues to hold. Consistency with normalization (12) requires k = 1;8k.








i ;8k, sellers' prices maintain world `real' resource use in each sector
completely insensitive to setting j = 1;8j.
10k, it naturally points to the world eciency measure of the eect of free trade agreements
developed below.

































In practice, since the P's are already solved for from (10)-(12), the 's are solved recur-
sively using the solution P's in (13).10
1.3 National Gains Measures
Accounting for the eect of trade cost changes on manufacturing real income in this setup
is very simple. For each good in each country, there is a `factory gate' price (unit cost
of production and distribution) pk
i in country i and product k. National manufacturing




i . Buyers in i face price indexes P k
i for
goods class k. The user cost index for all goods is given by Ci = exp(
P
k k lnP k
i ). Then




i =Ci = Ti
P
k qk















Ti is the ratio of the exact price index of exportable goods to the true cost of living index
of importable goods, satisfying the standard denition.
10This solution is consistent with solving (13)-(14) for the supply and expenditure shares implied by






i )1 k = 1;8k: (15)
(15) arises from interpreting the global sales pattern fY k
i =Y kg as arising from sales to a hypothetical
`world' consumer with CES preferences, resulting in Y k
i =Y k = (k
i pk
i k
i )1 k where the hypothetical
CES global price index is equal to 1.
11The eect on real manufacturing income in country i from a switch from No FTA
(denoted with superscript 0) to FTA (denoted with superscript F) can be evaluated
by computing the proportional real income change with the ratio RF
i =R0
i, equal to the
proportionate change in the terms of trade T F
i =T 0
i .11
1.4 World Eciency Measures
World eciency can be evaluated by further exploiting implications of the structural
gravity model. The iceberg melting metaphor is extended to a scalar aggregate using
the interpretation of outward multilateral resistance as aggregate sellers incidence and
inward multilateral resistance as buyers' incidence. Global aggregate sellers' incidence is
interpreted as global aggregate shrinkage due to `melting' prior to arrival on the `world'
market. Global aggregate buyers' incidence is interpreted as the further melting due to
shipment from the `world' market to its various destinations. This natural measure of
the FTA-induced change in the global eciency of distribution is an application of De-
breu's (1951) coecient of resource utilization as specialized in Deaton's (1979) distance
function.
The endowment of world resources is the vector fqk 
P
i qk
i g. In equilibrium, only
a fraction of the endowment arrives at the hypothetical `world' market for sellers to
exchange with buyers because some melts away in shipment to the `world' market. A
further nationally varying fraction melts away as the buyers ship their `world' market
purchases to their destinations. The aggregate sellers (across origins) and buyers (across
11A more formal treatment using the GDP function claries the relationship between our approach
focused on the manufacturing sectors and a full analysis of all sectors. Let the maximum value GDP
function be denoted g(;p;P;v) for a generic country, where  denotes the tradable goods price vector
in the rest of the economy, p the factory gate manufacturing price vector and P the manufacturing
input price vector. Dierentiating GDP with respect to the manufacturing prices and using Hotelling's
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where wk = Y k=
P
k Y k and !k = Ek=
P
k Ek. The square bracket term on the right hand side is the
percentage change in the terms of trade. It is multiplied by the importance of manufacturing in GDP, a
scaling factor we disregard. The second term on the right is equal to zero under balanced trade. While
this is not generally true for any subset of sectors, the normal convention is to impose it when all sectors
are included, so we suppress this term in our treatment. Equation (16) follows by integrating the square
bracket under the restrictions of xed q's and a Cobb-Douglas cost function C for input prices.
12destinations) melting fractions for each goods class k are derived utilizing structural
gravity and the CES technology structure. A further aggregation across the goods classes
is derived based on the Cobb-Douglas technology structure of the upper level technology
of manufacturing inputs.
Consistent aggregation of sellers' incidence across sources in each goods class k follows



























The rightmost equality follows from the normalization (15) of the hypothetical equilib-
rium: the hypothetical user price index for class k goods for the `world' user (i.e., the
user located in the `world' market) is equal to 1. The rst expression on the left hand
side of (17) is the product of the aggregate incidence k and the hypothetical frictionless
equilibrium price index. Exploiting the second equality in (17), the global sales can be





i )1 k1=(1 k). This is the iceberg melting metaphor in the aggregate.
k is a CES function of the k
i's, the (variable) weights being the hypothetical fric-







i )1 k: Re-writing (17), the












In the initial situation (without FTA's for example) the factory gate prices in (17)
are all equal to one, yielding aggregate sellers incidence k0. Bringing in the new trade
costs (the FTA's) induces new p's and new 's, and hence new aggregate eective
consumption. Let kF denote the value of k in the FTA equilibrium. For each goods
class, the eect of the FTA on global eciency via the sellers' incidence is measured by
k0=kF.
On the buyers' side of the market, goods are in eect purchased on the `world' market
in the total amount qk=k. For each destination j the goods are shipped home with
13further melting such that only Ek
j =P k
j arrives at destination j. Or, eectively the buyer
covers the full margin kP k
j . To aggregate across destinations the global average buyers












Then world use at destination is given by
qk
kP k; (20)
the world endowment of good k is deated by the product of the appropriate average
buyers and sellers incidence.
A scalar measure of the overall eciency gain requires some sort of weighting across
goods classes making use of the hypothetical world market and the identical technology








k k(lnk + lnP k)]
: (21)
Evaluating P at initial and FTA trade costs and forming their ratio 0P 0=FP F gives
a scalar measure of the global eciency gain from the shift in trade costs due to the FTA,
neatly decomposable into sellers' eciency change 0=F times buyers' eciency change
P 0=P F.
Figure 1 illustrates (21) for the case of two goods classes. E is the endowment point.
The line with slope equal to minus 1 through E denotes the initial value of the world
endowment. Point C denotes the initial equilibrium eective consumption of intermedi-
ates point q1=1;0P 1;0;q2=2;0P 2;0. The isoquant through point C gives all intermediates
consumption vectors c1;c2 satisfying f(c1;c2) = f(q1=1;0P 1;0;q2=2;0P 2;0) = f0. The
eciency of the initial equilibrium is given by the radial contraction along ray OE from
E to point A that gives the same level of output of the composite input as the actual
eective consumption at C. Thus 1=P = OA=OE. Point F denotes the FTA equilib-
rium eective consumption q1=1FP 1;F;q2=2FP 2;F. The isoquant associated with point














Figure 1.World Efﬁciency Measurement
Figure 1 also illustrates the global eciency measure within each goods class, rein-
terpreting the goods as varieties within a goods class and the isoquants as aggregators of
national varieties, understanding that they have CES structure instead of Cobb-Douglas.
The eect of the FTA-induced change in the factory gate equilibrium prices pk
i shifts the
weights in (18) as well as each country's sellers' incidence k
i.
2 Empirical Implementation and Analysis
2.1 Econometric Specication
The econometric specication of gravity is completed by substituting (7) for tij into (4)



















To obtain econometrically sound estimates of the parameters of interest from equation
(22), we address the following challenges: presence of zero trade ows; heteroskedasticity
15in trade ows data; endogeneity of free trade agreements; and, unobservable multilateral
resistance terms. To utilize the information carried by the zero trade ows and to account
for heteroskedasticity in trade ows data, we resort to the Poisson pseudo-maximum-
likelihood (PPML) estimator advocated by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2007) who argue
that the truncation of trade ows at zero biases the standard log-linear OLS approach.
In addition, they show that not accounting for heteroskedasticity in the log-linear OLS
regressions produces inconsistent coecient estimates.12
Following the developments in the empirical gravity literature, we use time-varying,
directional (source and destination), country-specic dummies to control for the multi-
lateral resistances.13 To account for FTA endogeneity, we use the panel data estimation
techniques described in Wooldridge (2002) and rst applied to a similar setting by Baier
and Bergstrand (2007), who employ aggregate data to show that direct FTA eects on
bilateral trade ows can be consistently isolated in a theoretically-founded gravity model
by using country-pair xed eects. Alternatively, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) argue
that consistent FTA estimates can be obtained with rst-dierenced panel data, which
eliminates the pair xed eects.14
Taking all of the above considerations into account, we use the PPML technique
to estimate the following econometric specication for each class of commodities in our
12Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) (HMR) propose an alternative approach. They develop a
formal model of selection to account for the zero trade ows, where exporters must absorb some xed
costs to enter a market. They use religion as an exogenous variable that enters selection but is excluded
from determination of the volume of trade. We choose not to use HMR, partly because of doubts about
the exclusion restriction and partly because of doubts about the importance of xed costs in light of
evidence in Besedes and Prusa (2006a,b) that highly disaggregated bilateral US trade ickers on and
o. Anderson and Yotov (2010b) show that HMR and PPML as well as OLS give essentially the same
bilateral trade costs after normalization.
13Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) use custom programming to account for the multilateral re-
sistances in a static setting. Feenstra (2004) advocates the directional, country-specic xed eects
approach. To estimate the eects of the Canadian Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT), Anderson and
Yotov (2010a) use panel data with time-varying, directional (source and destination), country-specic
xed eects. Olivero and Yotov (2011) formalize their econometric treatment of the MR terms in a
dynamic gravity setting.
14The issue of FTA endogeneity is not new to the trade literature (see Treer 1993, for example).
However, primarily due to the lack of reliable instruments, standard instrumental variable (IV) treatments
of endogeneity in cross-sectional settings have not been successful in addressing the problem. See for
example Magee (2003) and Baier and Bergstrand (2002, 2004b). Baier and Bergstrand (2007) summarize
the ndings from these studies as \at best mixed evidence of isolating the eect of FTAs on trade ows."
16sample:
Xij;t = exp[0+i;t+j;t+ij+1FTAij;t+2FTAij;t 1+3FTAij;t 2+ij;t]; 8k: (23)
Here, Xij is bilateral trade (in levels) between partners i and j at time t.15 FTAij;t is an
indicator variable that takes a value of one if at time t countries i and j are members of the
same free trade agreement. i;t denotes the time-varying source-country dummies, which
control for the (log of) outward multilateral resistances and total shipments. j;t encom-
passes the time varying destination country dummy variables that account for the (log
of) inward multilateral resistances and total expenditure. ij captures the country-pair
xed eects used to address FTA endogeneity. Time-invariant ij's are justied because
Anderson and Yotov (2010b) nd essentially time-invariant gravity coecients from the
same data, a pattern found by others dubbed the mystery of the missing globalization.
Following Baier and Bergstrand (2007) we specify the FTA volume eects,the 's, to
be uniform (as opposed to varying by FTA) and we allow for gradual phasing-in of the
free trade agreement eects by including FTA lags in specication (23). The reason for
the former is that, due to the rich xed eects structure of our econometric specication
and the small variability in any individual FTA indicators, we cannot identify separately
the eects of specic FTAs. The reason for the latter is that private agents in the trading
partners gradually adjust to the new economic conditions under a recently implemented
FTA. From an econometric perspective, allowing for phasing-in adds a time dimension
(in addition to the commodity, country, and producer and consumer dimensions) to the
data sets of welfare eects that we construct in the next section.
Finally, as noted by Cheng and Wall (2005), \Fixed-eects estimations are sometimes
criticized when applied to data pooled over consecutive years on the grounds that depen-
15In a static setting, (4) implies that income and expenditure elasticities of bilateral trade ows are
unitary and, therefore, size-adjusted trade is the natural dependent variable. Bringing output and
expenditures on the left-hand side has the additional advantage of controlling for endogeneity of these
variables. Using aggregate data however, Frankel (1997) shows that the bias due to GDP endogeneity is
insignicant. In addition, Olivero and Yotov (2011) show that income and expenditure elasticities are
not necessarily equal to one in a dynamic setting, such as the one that we employ here to account for
FTA endogeneity. Thus, in addition to accounting for the unobserved multilateral resistances, the xed
eects in our estimations will also absorb country-specic output and expenditures.
17dent and independent variables cannot fully adjust in a single year's time." (p.8). To
avoid this critique, we use only the years 1990, 1994, 1998, and 2002. This implies that
FTAij;t 1 and FTAij;t 2 are four-year and eight-year lags, respectively.
2.2 Data Description
This study covers the period 1990-2002 for a total of 41 trading partners including 40
separate countries and the rest of the world (ROW), consisting of 24 additional nations.16
None of the countries included in ROW are part of any FTAs with countries in the main
sample during the period of investigation.17 There are four nations however (Australia,
China, Japan, and South Korea), that are treated separately, even though they did not
enter any FTA between 1990 and 2002. We use these countries (outsiders), along with
the aggregate ROW region, to gauge FTA eects on non-members. The commodities
covered include manufacturing production classied according to the United Nations'
2-digit International Standard Industrial Classication (ISIC) Revision 2.18
To estimate gravity and to calculate the indexes of interest, we use industry-level
data on bilateral trade ows and output, and we construct expenditures, subject to our
structural model, for each trading partner and each commodity class, all measured in
thousands of current US dollars for the corresponding year.19 In addition, we use data
16The 40 countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Bolivia, Brazil,
Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Columbia, Costa Rica, Germany, Denmark, Ecuador, Spain, Finland,
France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Rep., Mexico,
Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, United
States. The rest of the world includes Cameroon, Cyprus, Egypt Arab Rep., Hong Kong, Indonesia, India,
Iran Islamic Rep., Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Sri Lanka, Macao, Malta, Myanmar, Malawi, Malaysia, Niger,
Nepal, Philippines, Senegal, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, Tanzania, South Africa.
17The ROW aggregation is to ease estimation by limiting the very large number of xed eects.
18The nine 2-digit ISIC manufacturing categories are (short labels, used for convenience throughout
the paper, are reported in parentheses): 31. Food, Beverages, and Tobacco Products (Food); 32. Textile,
Apparel, and Leather Products (Textile); 33. Wood and Wood Products (Wood); 34. Paper and Paper
Products (Paper); 35. Chemicals, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber, and Plastic Products (Chemicals); 36. Other
Non-metallic Products (Minerals); 37. Basic Metal Industries (Metals); 38. Fabricated Metal Products,
Machinery, Equipment (Machinery); 39. Other manufacturing. Inspection of the output data at the
3-digit and 4-digit ISIC level of aggregation reveals that many countries report Equipment production,
and especially Scientic Equipment production, under the category Other Manufacturing. Therefore, to
avoid inconsistencies, we combine the last two 2-digit categories into one, which we label Machinery.
19Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) discuss in length the implications of inappropriate deation of nominal
trade values, which they call \the bronze-medal mistake" in gravity estimations. Their most preferred
econometric specication is one with un-deated trade values, bilateral xed eects, and time-varying
country dummies, which, in addition to accounting for the multilateral resistances in a dynamic set-
ting, will \also eliminate any problems arising from the incorrect deation of trade." The structural
18on bilateral distances, contiguous borders, colonial ties, common language, elasticity of
substitution, and the presence of regional free trade agreements.
Summary statistics for the main estimation variables (described below) for the rst
and the last year in the sample as well as data sources and description of all other variables
employed in our estimations and analysis are presented in the Supplementary Appendix
accompanying this manuscript.20 Here, we just describe the two data sources that we use
to construct the main explanatory variable, an indicator regressor capturing the presence
of FTAs. Most of the data are from the FTA dataset constructed by Baier and Bergstrand
(2007), which we update with data on some additional agreements and years from the
World Trade Organization (WTO) web site.21 Following Baier and Bergstrand (2007),
we only consider full FTAs and customs unions that entered into force during the period
of investigation, 1990-2002. Table 1 lists the trade agreements included in our sample in
chronological order.
2.3 Gravity Estimation Results
Panel PPML estimates of equation (23), obtained with bilateral dummies and time-
varying, directional, xed eects, and accounting for FTA phasing in, are reported in
the second panel, labeled `First Stage', of Table 2. Free trade agreements have positive,
and economically and statistically signicant impact on bilateral trade ows between
member countries.22 There is phasing-in of the FTA eects, which are spread relatively
evenly over time. The two exceptions are `Wood and Wood Products' and `Paper and
Paper Products'. Allowing for phasing-in reveals that bilateral trade ows in these two
categories require some time to adjust to the implementation of free trade agreements.
In each case, the coecient on the second four-year lag FTA dummy, L2.FTA, is positive
interpretation of the time-varying, country-specic, directional xed eects (FEs) in our setting is a
combination of the multilateral resistance terms and the trading partners output and expenditures. It
is easy to see how the FEs would also absorb any deator indexes, exchange rates, etc. Thus, the real-
and nominal-trade estimates should be identical.
20Descriptive statistics for all variables as well as the data set itself are available by request.
21The data from Baier and Bergstrand (2007) can be accessed at the author's web sites http :
==www:nd:edu= jbergstr= and http : ==people:clemson:edu= sbaier=, respectively. The WTO data
is available at http : ==www:wto:org=english=tratope=regione=summarye:xls.
22`Paper and Paper Products' is the only category for which the initial FTA eect is negative and
marginally statistically signicant, however very small in magnitude.
19and economically and statistically signicant.23
FTA eects on bilateral trade at the commodity level are relatively persistent, how-
ever, there is no clear evidence of time trends. For some categories, such as `Textile,
Apparel, and Leather Products' and `Food, Beverages, and Tobacco Products', there
is a large initial eect followed by a gradual decrease. For other categories, such as
`Chemicals, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber, and Plastic Products', the initial FTA eect is
relatively small and it increases over time. Finally, there is no clear time trend for `Basic
Metal Products' and `Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery, and Equipment'. Estimates
from row `L2:FTA' indicate that, for most commodities, the FTA eects are still strong
nine years after their entry into force. With one exception, all point estimates of the
second four-year lag of the FTA dummy are positive and economically and statistically
signicant. The only exception (with positive but small and not statistically signicant
estimate) is `Food, Beverages, and Tobacco'. This suggests that FTA eects for all or
part of the products in this category are short-lived.
Row `FTA TOTAL' of Table 2 reports the total FTA eects obtained by summing
the values from the rst three rows for each product. Standard errors are obtained with
the Delta method. All estimates are positive and statistically signicant. There is signif-
icant variability (within reasonable bounds) in the average treatment FTA eect across
dierent products. The eect is weaker for commodity categories such as `Wood and
Wood Products', `Paper and Paper Products', and `Non-metallic Products', and stronger
for categories such as `Textile, Apparel, and Leather Products', `Basic Metal Industries',
and `Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery, and Equipment'. These estimates of dis-
aggregated direct FTA eects are in line with ndings from related studies that used
aggregated data. Varying between 0.286 (for Wood) and 1.291 (for Textiles), our num-
bers have central tendency comparable to the FTA average treatment eect estimate of
0.76 from Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and to the ATE eect of 0.94 from Rose (2004).
23Panel estimates obtained without lags (available by request) reveal that `Wood and Wood Products'
and `Paper and Paper Products' are the only two product categories for which the average FTA treatment
eects over the whole period 1990-2002 are not signicant. The fact that some average estimates show
insignicant, while some of their phasing-in components are signicant, reinforces our (and Baier and
Bergstrand's, 2007) preferred approach to allow for gradual FTA entering into force.
20To calculate tij's, we adopt a two-step procedure that allows us to simultaneously
estimate bilateral trade costs including internal trade costs.24 First, we estimate the panel
gravity model (23) using the PPML estimator with time-varying, source and destination
xed eects. Next, we re-estimate while imposing the rst stage estimated coecients
fb i; b it; b jtg and replacing the bilateral xed eects with a regression on the standard
time-invariant gravity covariates:
Xij = exp[ ^ 0 + ^ 1FTAij;t + ^ 2FTAij;t 1 + ^ 3FTAij;t 2 + 1 lnDISTij + 2BRDRij +
3LANGij + 4CLNYij +
45 X
i=5
iSMCTRYij + ^ i;t + ^ j;t + "ij;t]: (25)
Then, we use the obtained estimates and actual data on the gravity variables to construct








^ 1 lnDISTij+ ^ 2BRDRij+ ^ 3LANGij+ ^ 4CLNYij+
P45
i=5 ^ iSMCTRYij: (26)
Finally, we add the FTA estimates from (23) to construct a set of bilateral trade costs













^ ftaFTAij+^ l:ftaL:FTAij+^ l2:ftaL2:FTAij: (27)
Provided that the FTA estimates are unbiased (which is ensured by the panel data treat-
24One possibility to calculate the tij's is to use the estimates of the bilateral xed eects from speci-




^ ij+^ ftaFTAij+^ l:ftaL:FTAij+^ l2:ftaL2:FTAij; (24)
where ^ ij is constructed by adding up horizontally the estimates of the country-pair xed eects. ^ fta,
^ l:fta, and ^ l2:fta are the estimates of the current, lagged, and two-period lagged FTA eects, respectively.
This approach cannot obtain internal trade costs tii's because perfect collinearity does not allow for
separate identication of the xed eect estimates ^ ii's for individual countries in model (23). Another
approach that simultaneously obtains consistent gravity estimates (that can be used to construct bilateral
trade costs) and unbiased FTA estimates, is to regress the estimates of the bilateral xed eects from (23)
on the set of standard gravity variables. In analysis available by request, we improve on Cheng and Wall
(2005) by using variance weighted least squares to obtain unbiased gravity estimates from the bilateral
xed eects. However, the same critique (not being able to identify internal trade costs separately for






is a good proxy for the time-invariant trade costs (as ac-
cepted by the literature), (27) is a valid representation of the FTA eects on bilateral
trade costs.
Without going into details, we briey interpret the estimates of (25), which are pre-
sented in the top panel, labeled `Second Stage', of Table 2.25 All estimates of the eects
of bilateral distance on bilateral trade ows are negative and signicant. The variability
of the estimates across commodities reects the inuence of value/weight on transporta-
tion costs. Common borders facilitate trade. Without any exception, the estimates of
the coecients on BRDR are large, positive and signicant. The estimated coecient on
LANG is positive and signicant for only ve of the eight product categories, in contrast
to previous ndings on aggregated trade. A possible explanation for this result is that
over the past quarter-century, manufactures trade has grown between North and South,
enhanced by the vertical disintegration of manufacturing, both weakening the inuence
of common language relative to its eect on aggregate trade found in previous studies.
Notably, the largest estimate on LANG is for Paper, which can be explained with the
fact that this category includes `Printing and Publishing Products' whose consumption
requires knowledge of a specic language. The role of colonial ties in explaining bilateral
trade ows in our analysis is low relative to earlier studies on aggregate data. Six of the
eight estimates are positive and signicant, marginally so in the case of Minerals. Using
more disaggregated data, Anderson and Yotov (2010b) nd even weaker evidence of the
eects of colonial ties. Home bias in trade is captured by the large, positive, and signif-
icant estimates on SMCTRY. These numbers are obtained as weighted averages across
all regions in the sample. Individual, country-specic estimates are available by request.
The variation of the SMCTRY estimates is intuitive across goods. In particular, the esti-
mates on Food and Paper, which includes `Printing and Publishing Products', are among
the largest, while the estimates on Textiles and Machinery, industries with clear patterns
of international specialization, are among the smallest.
Overall, the results from Table 2 are convincing. Aggregate estimations with similar
25For a more thorough discussion on a wider set of disaggregated gravity estimates see Anderson and
Yotov (2010b).
22properties have been interpreted as strong evidence in support of gravity theory and
used to construct aggregate bilateral trade costs. Similarly, the set of standard gravity
covariates and the commodity level estimates derived here can be used to construct a
reasonable measure of disaggregated bilateral trade costs.
3 Real Income Eects of FTA's
Using the theory of Section 1 and the inferred trade costs of Section 2 we calculate the
terms of trade and global eciency eects of the FTAs that entered into force between
1990 and 2002. We also analyze the counter-factual experiment of switching o NAFTA.
3.1 Terms of Trade Eects
The eects on the sellers and the buyers in each country are reported separately and
combined into the change in the terms of trade. Finally, we present the global eciency
measures.
Most of the indexes reported here are at the country- and commodity-level and are
consistently aggregated from country-commodity pair numbers. The latter are available
by request. In addition, to gauge the signicance of our indexes, we calculate standard
errors by bootstrapping the original FTA estimates. In particular, we rst generate 100
sets of bootstrapped PPML gravity estimates of (23), which we use to calculate 100 sets




i=1( d INDi   d IND)2
n
;
where: d IND can be any index of interest obtained with the original estimates; d INDi
is the corresponding number from the ith bootstrap sample; and n is the number of
bootstrapped sets.
FTA Eects on Sellers. We use factory-gate prices, p's, to measure FTA eects on
producers, obtained by solving for market clearing prices in (9) subject to normalization



























(28) consists of NK-K independent equations and, as discussed earlier, due to the resr-









interpreted as maintaining world `real' resource use in each sector k.
We need data on the elasticity of substitution for each goods' class, k, and on the CES
share parameters for each country-commodity combination, k
i . Data on the elasticity of
substitution are from Broda et al (2006),26 while we construct the CES share parameters





















By construction, all p's for 1990 are equal to one. The numbers for each of the
other three years in our sample (1994, 1998 and 2002) take into account the presence
and phasing-in of all free trade agreements that entered into force between 1990 and
2002. We use sectoral output shares as weights to obtain country-level estimates of the
factory-gate prices. The numbers in columns 1-3 of Table 3 are percentage changes in
prices calculated using the phased-in FTA's for the three years shown. These sellers' price
changes measure FTA general equilibrium incidence on the producers in each country.
There is wide variability in the FTA eects on producers. More than one third of
the world's producers suer losses, while the rest enjoy gains. The gains for the winners
might be at the expense of the losers. Five of the six biggest losers are the regions that did
not enter any FTAs during the 90's. Nevertheless, producer losses are relatively small.
26See the Data Appendix for description and further details on these numbers. In principle, both the
k's and the k
i 's can be estimated from the structural gravity model. The estimate of the elasticity of
substitution arises as the coecient on taris in the gravity model. Due to the lack of reliable sectoral
tari data for the period of investigation however, we choose to use the numbers from Broda et al (2006).
The k
i 's can also be constructed from gravity, each of them as combination of the exporters' xed eects.
We experimented with those estimates and we obtain initial factory-gate prices that are close to one but
not exactly equal to one. Thus, for general equilibrium consistency we chose the method described in
the text.
24Japan, China and S. Korea register the largest losses of more than 0.5%, followed by
Chile, ROW and Australia with similar losses. Trade diversion explains why losers lose,
while the gainers gains are partly due to the shift from the losers and partly due to a
direct benet of lower trade costs due to the FTA | in eect a transfer from nature.
Even though, our sample of outsiders is small, it is tempting to note that producers in
the bigger outside regions suer more.
Interestingly, the next group of countries where producers suer most from FTAs'
are developed nations, including US and Canada. We attribute the negative eects on
US and Canadian producers to NAFTA, even though both countries entered other FTAs
during the period of investigation as well. Producers in other developed nations suered
minor losses too. The losses for the developed countries are across all sectors but are
more pronounced in sectors such as Textile, Apparel, and Leather Products (Textile) and
Basic Metal Industries (Metals).
The biggest winners from the integration of the 90's are producers from relatively
small European and Latin American economies that signed FTAs with large trading
partners. From the European economies, Poland and Hungary are leaders with producer
gains of 7.3% and 5.5%, respectively, followed by Bulgaria with 5.3% increase in pro-
ducer prices and Romania with 3.9%. Membership to the Central European Free Trade
Agreement (CEFTA), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and, consequently,
to the European Union (EU) should explain the strong positive eects in these nations.
The large gains for these countries come at the expense of other EU members. This is
supported by the small losses for the producers in the larger European economies.
Of the Latin American countries, Mexican producers are the biggest winners with
3.3% increase in their factory-gate prices. Combined with the fact that US and Canada
are among the countries with FTA producer losses, this result suggests that NAFTA has
benetted Mexican producers disproportionately, at the expense of producers in the other
two partners. The counterfactual exercise of switching o NAFTA (described in Section
3.3) shows that NAFTA is the main reason for the gains to Mexican producers, despite
a series of bilateral FTAs as well as agreements between Mexico and most of the other
25Latin American economies.
FTA Eects on Buyers. FTA eects on buyers in the world are reported in columns 4-
6 of Table 3. Country-level indexes are obtained by aggregating the country-commodity
numbers with sectoral-level expenditure shares used as weights. The numbers in each
column are percentage changes in the inward multilateral resistances for the base year
calculated with and without FTA's. Column `%02' captures the total eects over the
period 1990-2002 because the 2002 bilateral trade costs (used in the construction of the
2002 IMRs) account for the cumulative, direct FTA impact.
Without exception, buyers in the world benetted from the integration of the 90's with
benets increasing over time. Importantly, even buyers in nations that did not enter any
free trade agreement during the period of investigation enjoy lower prices.27 All ve such
regions in our sample (Australia, China, Japan, South Korea and ROW) register small
IMR decreases, though not the smallest in the sample. Another interesting example is
Morocco. This country did not enter any FTAs until 2000, yet it enjoyed IMR, though
economically insignicant, falls in 1994 and in 1998. The gains increased signicantly
in 2002 following Morocco's FTA with the European Union in 2000. The intuition is
positive spill-over eects: producers in nations that entered FTAs enjoy eciency gains
in distribution that are passed on to all their trading partners, including the ones with
whom they have no FTAs.
The variability of the FTA eects on buyers across countries is wide and the pattern
makes good intuitive sense for the most part. The biggest FTA winners are relatively
small countries that are geographically close to their major markets. Thus the largest FTA
gains are for some small European economies including Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria. A
partial additional explanation is that liberalization-induced trade cost reductions occurred
prior to the FTA because all these nations are founding members of the Central European
Free Trade Agreement in 1993, and each of them signed an agreement with, rst, the
27By denition, the IMR values in principle are comparable to price indexes, and in particular their
variation across countries might be expected to reect variation in consumer (or user) price indexes across
regions. The IMR's have more variation than CPI's, and we expect that they only loosely track variations
in consumer price indexes. A possible explanation is that the inward incidence of trade costs probably
falls on intermediate goods users in a way that does not show up in measured prices. In addition, by
construction, the IMRs capture the home bias in preferences that cannot show up in prices.
26European Free Trade Association, and then with the European Union. Romania follows
a similar integration pattern and also registers signicant buyer gains.
Buyers in many of the Latin American countries are in the upper tail of the FTA gains'
distribution too. Bolivia is the leader with consumer gains of more than 5%. Uruguay and
Mexico follow closely with more than 4% gains. Chile, Ecuador and Argentina also enjoy
signicant buyer gains. All these nations are members of the Latin American Free Trade
Agreement (LAFTA), since 1993. In addition, most of these countries are (founding)
members of Mercosur and have FTAs with each other. Finally, NAFTA and series of
bilateral FTAs between Mexico and other countries may contribute to the positive eects
for this particular country.28 Another country that enjoys large buyer gains is Tunisia.
The explanation is this nation's FTA with the EU in 1998. Note that in 1994, Tunisia
experiences only very small gains from the integration taking place in the rest of the
world.
Buyers in most of the developed economies enjoy moderate FTA gains. This is in
accordance with the classical trade theory prediction of smaller gains from freer trade for
the larger trading partners. Finally, we nd that buyers in the ve regions that were not
involved in any trade agreement initiated between 1990 and 2002 are among the regions
in the lower half of the distribution of gains from globalization taking place in the rest of
the world.
Terms of Trade Indexes. We combine buyer and seller indexes for each country and
year in our sample to obtain terms of trade (ToT) numbers and their percentage changes







i is dened by (16) evaluated at FTA (t = F) and initial (t = 0) prices. Ti
decomposes into the seller price and buyer price multiplicative components reported sep-
28When interpreting our results, the reader should remember that the equilibrium welfare eects in
each country are generated in response to the impact of all FTAs in our sample. While it is probably
true that the strongest FTA eect on Mexico comes from NAFTA, the model allows for any other FTA
to also inuence the welfare of Mexican consumers and producers, even if Mexico is not part of the FTA
at all. This is why we observe welfare eects for the countries that did not participate in any free trade
agreement initiated between 1990 and 2002.
27arately and multiplicatively combined in the last three columns of Table 3.29 The only
regions whose terms of trade worsen during the the 90's are the ones that did not enter
any FTA. Even though buyers in these regions enjoyed small FTA gains, integration in
the rest of the world had a stronger negative impact on sellers. Second, all countries
that entered FTAs during the 90's enjoy real income (ToT) gains. This suggests that (i)
the direct FTA eects among trading partners dominates the indirect FTA eect from
ongoing regional integration in the rest of the world, and (ii) the losses for the producers
in larger FTA members are dominated by consumer gains at the national level.
Third, the three nations with the largest ToT improvement during the 90s (of more
than 10%) include Poland, Hungar and Bulgaria. Tunisia is close behind with a ToT im-
provement of almost 10%. The next geographical group of countries that have benetted
enormously from globalization are some Latin American Nations including Mexico, with
gains of 7.6% and Uruguay and Bolivia with gains of more than 6%. It should be noted
that Mexican producers gain more than producers in Uruguay and Bolivia, but the gains
for consumers in the latter two nations are larger. Finally, as expected, large nations
benet less from FTAs. Thus, almost all developed economies are ordered in the lower
tail of the distribution of ToT increases.30 However, it is important to emphasize that all
FTA members enjoy some gains. For example, even though US and Canadian producers
suered losses (probably due to NAFTA) their buyers gain more. In sum, our ndings
suggest that the integration of the 90's benetted FTA members while hurting outsiders
by an amount too small to be noticeable.
3.2 Global Eciency Eects
To calculate global eciency indexes (rst at the commodity level and then at the world
level), rst, we obtain aggregates of the outward multilateral resistances (presented and
described in the Supplementary Appendix) and of the inward multilateral resistances
(discussed above) across all countries. Then, as described in the theoretical section,
we construct eciency measures for each year in our sample. Eciency estimates are
29The buyers' and sellers' price changes do not sum to the ToT because the changes are discrete.
30Austria is an exception with total gains of 7.9%, which fall mostly on the consumer side.
28reported in Table 4. The rst eight rows of the table report global sectoral indexes and
the last row presents the global eciency measure for world manufacturing in each year.
The last column of the table presents the total eciency changes caused by FTAs during
the whole period of investigation.
As can be seen from column `%2002', without any exception, all of the sectors in our
sample enjoy statistically signicant eciency gains and there is wide variability across
industries. The largest eect is for Textiles, where we estimate an eciency gain due
to FTAs of more than 2 percent. Metals also register a large gain of close to 1%. Food
follows with gains of close to 0.7%. The sectors with smallest eciency gains are Paper
and Minerals. A possible explanation for these results is that Paper and Minerals are the
sectors with largest SMCTRY estimates, indicating bias toward domestic consumption,
while Textiles, for example, is the industry with the lowest SMCTRY estimate. Interest-
ingly however, even though Food had one of the largest estimates of the coecient on
internal trade, we nd this sector to experience relatively large eciency gains.
The sectoral level eciency measures combine to a global eciency index for the
world of 0.62%, which is driven by the large combined share of Food, Textiles and Metals
in world manufacturing. It is also interesting to note that for each sector, as well as
for global manufacturing, we see that the FTA numbers presented in Table 4 increase
over time. In fact we estimate small eciency losses for Paper in 1994 and 1998 and for
Minerals in 1994. In sum, the indexes presented here reveal signicant eciency gains
due to the FTAs that entered into force between 1990 and 2002. In addition, we provide
evidence that the global eciency FTA eects are persistent over time in most sectors.
3.3 Counterfactual Experiments
The framework of this paper is now applied to isolate the eects of a particular free trade
agreement (NAFTA) as well as the impact of all FTAs signed by a specic nation (Mex-
ico).31 The choice of NAFTA and Mexico, respectively, for counterfactual experiments
31These FTAs include LAFTA/LAIA (1993) and series of bilateral agreements between Mexico and
other partners including Bolivia (1995), Costa Rica (1995), Columbia (1995) (As part of the Group of
Three. The third country, Venezuela, is not in the sample), the EU (2000), and Israel (2000).
29seems natural as both have been objects of interest for an extensive literature.32
First, we estimate a hypothetical set of multilateral resistances, factory-gate prices
and corresponding FTA ToT eects as if there is no NAFTA (but all other FTAs are
still in place). Then, we shut down the rest of the Mexican free trade agreements and we
estimate the eects from globalization happening elsewhere in the world.
Table 5 presents our ndings. For brevity, we only report the changes in the total
welfare (ToT) eects. The numbers in Columns 1 of the table are the indexes from the last
column of Table 3, capturing total welfare eects from all FTAs that entered into force
during the period of investigation. Column 2 reports welfare eects without NAFTA. The
estimates are revealing. First, we nd that NAFTA benets all members, but most of
all Mexico. We estimate a staggering fall in the ToT gains for Mexico. NAFTA accounts
for more than 82% percent of the gains from all Mexican FTAs. Canada and the US
benet from NAFTA too, but the real income gains for these countries are signicantly
smaller, less than 0.1% each. These results are in accordance with ndings from series
of computationally intensive CGE models.33 Second, our estimates indicate that without
NAFTA both Canada and US will actually suer from integration taking place in the rest
of the world during the period of investigation. Note, for example, that the welfare eect
for Canada becomes negative after the removal of NAFTA, even though this country has
bilateral FTAs with Chile and Bolivia. This suggests that (i) either the direct eects
of these two FTA's on Canadian producers are negative and outweigh consumer gains,
or (ii) that the eects of globalization elsewhere dominate the direct Canada-Chile and
Canada-Bolivia FTA eects.
Third, the hypothetical removal of NAFTA has small impact on other countries
32Our framework can be applied to study series of other interesting counterfactual experiments in-
cluding global free trade, switch on FTAs for all bilaterals i 6= j, or a 1% fall in trade barriers for all
bilaterals i 6= j. Another area where our methods can lead to potentially very important contributions is
in providing much needed empirical evidence on whether regionalism is a stumbling block or a stepping
stone toward global free trade. See the concluding section for more interesting applications.
33Our estimate of the welfare gains for Mexico from NAFTA falls comfortably within the range of
corresponding CGE indexes. The majority of these numbers are in the 5%-6% range, but some studies
predict 11% welfare gains by the year 2000 (see McLeery, 1992) and even 14% by 2003 (see Klein and
Salvatore, 1995). See Brown et al. (1992a) for a concise summary of the ndings from leading CGE
models regarding the welfare implications of NAFTA.
30too.34 According to our estimates, most non-NAFTA members would enjoy small gains if
NAFTA were not there. The natural explanation is trade diversion toward the large US
market, which no longer is served `freely' by Mexico and Canada. However, we also see
some outside nations suering from the removal of NAFTA. Chile, for example, registers
small ToT losses. The explanation might again be trade diversion in the form of increased
Mexican presence in the Latin American markets.
In a nal experiment all FTAs in which Mexico took part during the period of inves-
tigation are shut down. The resulting changes in the national terms of trade indexes are
reported in column 3 of Table 5. Several properties stand out: (a) Mexico is the country
that suers the largest welfare loss. The total FTA welfare eects for this country become
negative. If not involved in integration, Mexico would have suered a minor (0.06%) de-
crease in its terms of trade and manufacturing real GDP due to the FTAs happening
elsewhere in the world. (b) All other Latin American countries also experience (often
signicant) welfare losses due to the removal of the FTA relations that they have with
Mexico.35 Most of the Latin American countries, however, still enjoy positive FTA wel-
fare eects, probably due to the strong FTA connections among themselves. Costa Rica
is the only exception with negative terms of trade changes. (c) Some (more developed)
economies in Europe also suer mild welfare losses. This implies that the direct eects of
the removal of the FTA between Mexico and the European Union dominate the indirect
(trade diversion) eects from the removal of the rest of the Mexican FTAs (but NAFTA).
4 Conclusion
The numbers presented in this paper portray a regional integration process in the 1990's
that increased eciency in each manufacturing sector and in the global economy overall,
provided many integrating partners with substantial gains and inicted small losses on
a few countries that did not enter FTA's. The methods developed and the numbers
34The small eects on the rest of the world are in accordance with the conclusions from Brown et al.
(1992b).
35Note that some of those countries would have benetted from the removal of NAFTA. Probably due
to trade diversion.
31calculated here should be useful for many other purposes.
Our results include a multi-dimensional (country, commodity, and time) data set of
producer price, terms of trade and global eciency indexes that can be used to test
numerous predictions from the theoretical literature on trade liberalization. Preliminary
investigation indicates that larger FTA gains are associated with larger number of FTA
partners and larger increase in the volume of trade caused by FTAs. In addition, FTA
real income gains are inversely related to relative country size and to pre-FTA volumes
of trade. These relationships accord with stylized theoretical trade predictions, and open
avenues for future empirical work.
The paper oers new methods for analyzing the international externality eects of
many policy changes. These can shed light on whether regionalism is a stumbling block
or a stepping stone toward global free trade. Terms of trade externalities also arise
from policies other than FTA's or other trade policies. Future work on domestic policy
changes that aect internal trade costs relative to international ones (such as China's
massive infrastructure investments), aect supplier costs and volume or buyer costs and
volume (such as carbon emissions controls) can readily be examined within this frame-
work. Analysis of intra-national vs. inter-national policies yields important insights (see
for example Anderson and Yotov, 2010a).
The simplicity, tractability, and predictive power of the structural gravity model make
it an attractive complement to Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) simulation mod-
els. The general equilibrium structure of distribution naturally nests inside typical CGE
structures, pointing the way toward a better combination of empirical and simulation
modeling.
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36Table 1: Free Trade Agreements
European Union, or EU (1958): Belgium{Luxembourg, France, Italy, Germany, Netherlands,
Denmark (1973), Ireland (1973), United Kingdom (1973), Greece (1981), Portugal (1986),
Spain (1986), Iceland (1994) Austria (1995), Finland (1995), Sweden (1995)
European Free Trade Association, or EFTA (1960): Austria (until 1995), Denmark
(until 1973), Iceland (1970), Finland (1986{1995), Norway, Portugal (until 1986),
Sweden (until 1995), Switzerland, United Kingdom (until 1973)
Latin American Free Trade Agreement/Latin American Integration Agreement, or
LAFTA/LAIA (1993{): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay











Andean Community (1993): Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador
EU{Hungary (1994)
EU{Poland (1994)





Columbia{Mexico (1995). As part of the Group of Three. The third country, Venezuela,
is not in the sample.




















This table lists, in chronological order, all free trade agreements used in the estimations. Only agreements
involving the countries in our sample are included. FTAs that entered into force before 1990 are used, when
appropriate, to construct the lagged variables of the FTA dummy variable. The latter is constructed from





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































38Table 3: General Equilibrium FTA Eects, 1990-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Country Name Factory-gate Prices IMR's ToT Eects
%94 %98 %02 %94 %98 %02 %94 %98 %02
Argentina .272 .501 .648 -.357 -.787 -1.405 .631 1.296 2.115
(.009) (.019) (.025) (.014) (.031) (.04) (.021) (.048) (.062)
Australia -.037 -.14 -.286 -.023 -.104 -.214 -.012 -.03 -.059
(.002) (.005) (.008) (.001) (.004) (.007) (.001) (.001) (.002)
Austria .049 1.147 2.756 -.211 -2.348 -4.676 .263 3.604 7.868
(.005) (.043) (.106) (.006) (.082) (.166) (.009) (.129) (.296)
Bulgaria 1.152 3.262 5.272 -.802 -2.669 -5.209 2.018 6.182 11.079
(.039) (.113) (.165) (.028) (.098) (.155) (.069) (.22) (.349)
Blgm-Lxmbrg -.041 .026 .147 -.045 -.122 -.197 .004 .133 .311
(.001) (.004) (.008) (.001) (.005) (.007) (0) (.004) (.011)
Bolivia -.021 .156 .565 -1.767 -3.431 -5.195 2.004 4.145 6.743
(.01) (.019) (.029) (.054) (.115) (.139) (.064) (.149) (.187)
Brazil .096 .108 .112 -.004 -.077 -.18 .111 .214 .331
(.004) (.006) (.009) (.001) (.003) (.007) (.003) (.008) (.01)
Canada -.004 -.043 -.126 -.008 -.076 -.179 .003 .026 .043
(0) (.002) (.004) (0) (.003) (.006) (0) (.001) (.002)
Switzerland -.009 -.025 -.006 -.129 -.177 -.177 .119 .151 .172
(.002) (.003) (.006) (.004) (.007) (.006) (.004) (.007) (.009)
Chile -.284 -.371 -.299 -.945 -1.974 -3.049 .744 1.761 3.012
(.012) (.016) (.023) (.031) (.071) (.096) (.026) (.067) (.092)
China -.1 -.335 -.6 -.051 -.193 -.355 -.038 -.108 -.18
(.004) (.012) (.019) (.002) (.008) (.012) (.002) (.004) (.006)
Columbia .019 .067 .043 -.006 -.066 -.179 .024 .127 .215
(.001) (.003) (.005) (.001) (.004) (.008) (.001) (.004) (.008)
Costa Rica -.027 .014 -.015 .013 -.037 -.178 -.041 .048 .162
(.001) (.004) (.006) (.001) (.003) (.008) (.001) (.003) (.009)
Germany -.01 .158 .412 -.08 -.146 -.16 .065 .273 .512
(.001) (.01) (.018) (.002) (.007) (.007) (.002) (.009) (.016)
Denmark -.008 .257 .566 -.052 -.235 -.463 .041 .457 .966
(.001) (.009) (.021) (.002) (.009) (.017) (.002) (.014) (.033)
Ecuador -.061 -.003 .175 -.934 -1.879 -2.95 .923 1.991 3.342
(.009) (.015) (.025) (.03) (.067) (.085) (.032) (.079) (.105)
Spain -.045 -.097 -.142 -.05 -.227 -.465 .004 .117 .291
(.002) (.005) (.008) (.002) (.009) (.017) (0) (.004) (.01)
Finland -.006 .05 .518 -.228 -1.6 -3.114 .193 1.53 3.452
(.002) (.009) (.028) (.008) (.056) (.112) (.006) (.054) (.125)
France -.047 -.044 -.008 -.051 -.131 -.211 .004 .084 .194
(.001) (.003) (.004) (.002) (.004) (.007) (0) (.003) (.007)
UK -.045 -.123 -.186 -.056 -.258 -.486 .01 .115 .259
(.002) (.004) (.006) (.002) (.008) (.016) (0) (.004) (.009)
Greece -.079 .069 .23 -.029 -.772 -1.687 -.047 .908 2.04
(.002) (.009) (.02) (.001) (.025) (.059) (.002) (.031) (.079)
Hungary 1.867 3.567 5.513 -1.876 -4.232 -6.857 3.828 8.166 13.192
(.059) (.129) (.16) (.074) (.164) (.217) (.135) (.314) (.425)
Ireland -.025 .043 .144 -.053 -.283 -.58 .027 .311 .691
(.001) (.003) (.008) (.002) (.01) (.02) (.001) (.01) (.023)
Iceland .065 .061 .102 -.244 -.508 -.8 .31 .572 .91
(.002) (.004) (.005) (.009) (.02) (.025) (.01) (.022) (.027)
Israel .204 .304 1.14 -.388 -.781 -2.435 .608 1.104 3.684
(.01) (.016) (.046) (.012) (.028) (.063) (.022) (.043) (.111)
Italy -.081 -.08 -.045 -.073 -.239 -.416 -.005 .168 .383
(.003) (.004) (.006) (.002) (.007) (.013) (.001) (.006) (.014)
Continued
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Country Name Factory-gate Prices IMR's ToT Eects
%94 %98 %02 %94 %98 %02 %94 %98 %02
Japan -.065 -.266 -.527 -.042 -.183 -.377 -.01 -.042 -.074
(.004) (.012) (.02) (.003) (.009) (.014) (.001) (.002) (.003)
S. Korea -.071 -.267 -.509 -.035 -.158 -.31 -.022 -.07 -.125
(.003) (.011) (.017) (.002) (.007) (.012) (.001) (.002) (.004)
Morocco -.067 -.242 .888 -.003 -.009 -2.213 -.064 -.233 3.206
(.002) (.008) (.042) (0) (.001) (.079) (.002) (.007) (.117)
Mexico 1.203 2.237 3.319 -.571 -1.765 -4.322 1.712 3.91 7.593
(.038) (.072) (.093) (.033) (.081) (.134) (.057) (.146) (.22)
Netherlands -.02 .124 .316 -.045 -.135 -.235 .022 .228 .489
(.001) (.005) (.012) (.002) (.005) (.009) (.001) (.007) (.016)
Norway .001 -.072 -.06 -.227 -.472 -.662 .205 .358 .539
(.001) (.003) (.008) (.008) (.018) (.022) (.007) (.015) (.017)
Poland 2.396 4.666 7.31 -2.102 -4.766 -7.701 4.586 9.908 16.112
(.077) (.167) (.207) (.086) (.186) (.246) (.165) (.383) (.521)
Portugal -.071 -.122 -.15 -.06 -.31 -.642 -.009 .195 .498
(.002) (.005) (.005) (.002) (.011) (.023) (.001) (.008) (.019)
Romania .698 2.297 3.851 -.213 -1.31 -3.068 .907 3.614 6.971
(.022) (.075) (.12) (.011) (.057) (.107) (.031) (.128) (.232)
ROW -.045 -.156 -.266 -.014 -.067 -.11 -.024 -.067 -.115
(.002) (.006) (.01) (.001) (.003) (.005) (.001) (.002) (.004)
Sweden 0 .053 .522 -.231 -1.706 -3.222 .202 1.643 3.586
(.003) (.014) (.031) (.008) (.054) (.111) (.007) (.057) (.13)
Tunisia -.09 1.625 3.49 .008 -2.415 -5.223 -.099 4.211 9.267
(.003) (.062) (.146) (0) (.089) (.191) (.003) (.147) (.356)
Turkey .206 1.065 2.014 -.461 -1.961 -3.889 .678 3.04 5.898
(.013) (.049) (.085) (.018) (.072) (.121) (.024) (.108) (.195)
Uruguay .617 1.327 2.093 -1.393 -2.819 -4.438 2.25 4.663 7.451
(.023) (.056) (.072) (.045) (.098) (.124) (.074) (.173) (.22)
USA .004 -.011 -.087 -.022 -.062 -.158 .019 .039 .054
(.001) (.001) (.005) (.001) (.002) (.006) (.001) (.002) (.002)
Notes: This table reports percentage changes in the factory-gate prices, the inward multilateral
resistances and the ToT indexes for each country and year in our sample. Country-level factory-
gate prices are constructed as weighted averages across all country-commodity indexes with
output shares used as weights. IMR's are aggregated from the country-commodity numbers
with expenditure shares used as weights. ToT's are calculated as the dierence between the
corresponding eects on producers (the factory-gate prices) and consumers (IMR's). Standard
errors are obtained as described in the text.
40Table 4: Global Eciency Indexes, 1990-2002
Country Name %1994 %1998 %2002
Food .18 .457 .683
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Textile .395 1.24 2.056
(0.001) (.002) (0.004)
Wood .001 .126 .548
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Paper -.003 -.001 .164
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Chemicals .07 .252 .524
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Minerals -.017 .011 .113
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Metals .217 .524 .967
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Machinery .054 .229 .478
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mnfctrng .102 .328 .622
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Notes: This table reports global eciency measures
for each sector and aggregate manufacturing numbers
obtained from the country-commodity OMR's. See
text for procedures used to obtain the eciency
indexes and the standard errors accompanying them.
41Table 5: Counterfactual FTA Experiments
(1) (2) (3)
Country Name All FTAs No NAFTA No FTAs Mexico
Argentina 2.115 2.12 1.955
(.062) (.053) (.046)
Australia -.059 -.049 -.045
(.002) (.002) (.006)
Austria 7.868 7.874 7.87
(.296) (.266) (.261)
Bulgaria 11.079 11.088 11.074
(.349) (.32) (.32)
Blgm-Lxmbrg .311 .315 .308
(.011) (.006) (.011)
Bolivia 6.743 6.741 6.457
(.187) (.166) (.151)
Brazil .331 .337 .251
(.01) (.009) (.009)
Canada .043 -.007 -.003
(.002) (.003) (.007)
Switzerland .172 .178 .174
(.009) (.019) (.027)
Chile 3.012 2.998 2.77
(.092) (.083) (.071)
China -.18 -.171 -.155
(.006) (.01) (.011)
Columbia .215 .228 .054
(.008) (.008) (.02)
Costa Rica .162 .184 -.115
(.009) (.005) (.023)
Germany .512 .518 .514
(.016) (.009) (.009)
Denmark .966 .964 .954
(.033) (.016) (.016)
Ecuador 3.342 3.375 2.994
(.105) (.099) (.08)
Spain .291 .297 .281
(.01) (.005) (.006)
Finland 3.452 3.456 3.45
(.125) (.117) (.114)
France .194 .193 .193
(.007) (.01) (.01)
UK .259 .264 .259
(.009) (.011) (.008)
Greece 2.04 2.043 2.028
(.079) (.062) (.06)
Hungary 13.192 13.195 13.185
(.425) (.41) (.408)
Ireland .691 .696 .679
(.023) (.021) (.014)
Iceland .91 .914 .88
(.027) (.022) (.024)
Israel 3.684 3.696 3.682
(.111) (.115) (.109)
Italy .383 .387 .385
(.014) (.007) (.007)
Japan -.074 -.067 -.064
Continued
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(1) (2) (3)
Country Name All FTAs No NAFTA No FTAs Mexico
(.003) (.004) (.004)
S. Korea -.125 -.113 -.105
(.004) (.002) (.002)
Morocco 3.206 3.214 3.199
(.117) (.122) (.114)
Mexico 7.593 1.368 -.06
(.22) (.032) (.025)
Netherlands .489 .489 .483
(.016) (.013) (.013)
Norway .539 .547 .534
(.017) (.017) (.019)
Poland 16.112 16.117 16.111
(.521) (.498) (.503)
Portugal .498 .511 .495
(.019) (.01) (.011)
Romania 6.971 6.978 6.966
(.232) (.218) (.214)
ROW -.115 -.111 -.103
(.004) (.007) (.008)
Sweden 3.586 3.596 3.588
(.13) (.123) (.12)
Tunisia 9.267 9.273 9.257
(.356) (.368) (.355)
Turkey 5.898 5.905 5.896
(.195) (.184) (.182)
Uruguay 7.451 7.471 7.196
(.22) (.199) (.184)
USA .054 -.024 -.019
(.002) (.001) (.002)
Notes: The indexes in this table are aggregate country-level
ToT eects. The numbers in column 1 account for the pre-
sence of all FTAs. The numbers in column 2 are constructed
as if there was no NAFTA. The indexes in the third column
are calculated as if Mexico was not involved in any FTA
during the 90s. Standard errors are obtained as described
in the text.
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